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Glossary · Game Theory

Focal Point (Schelling Point)

also: Schelling point · coordination game · coordination games · coordination problem · salient equilibrium

Definition

A focal point, or Schelling point, is the equilibrium players converge on in a coordination game without communicating, because something about it stands out: salience, precedent, or convention. Schelling (1960) documented the effect experimentally; in markets it explains why standards wars, default settings, and round-number prices resolve the way they do rather than the way the theory alone would predict.

Coordination games have multiple equilibria and the formal theory is silent on which one obtains. Schelling's contribution was to notice that real people solve the selection problem with shared culture: asked to meet a stranger in New York without arranging a time or place, most of his respondents chose Grand Central at noon. In technology markets the same forces operate at scale. Expectations about which standard will win are self-fulfilling, which is why pre-announcements, partner logos, and installed-base statistics matter more than product quality during a standards war, and why a launch that needs suppliers, developers, and customers to move together lives or dies on making one option feel inevitable.

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